Peer-Reviewed Publications
Does Ideology Influence Hiring in China? Evidence from Two Randomized Experiments. 2022. With Jennifer Pan.
Appendix Replication
Forthcoming at Political Science Research and Methods.
China after Mao is typically characterized as a country where economic opportunities are based on merit instead of ideological conformity. However, the salience of ideology has grown under the rule of Xi Jinping. Using a large-scale resume audit experiment and a conjoint survey experiment of hiring managers in China, we find that firms in China do not reward job candidates for expressing conformity to the ideology of the regime, but job candidates who express support for Western democracy are less employable. Results suggest that firms in innovative industries designated as strategically important by the Chinese regime (e.g. artificial intelligence) penalize support for Western democracy by the largest magnitude while the remaining firms in innovative industries do not penalize political non-conformity.
Appendix Replication
Forthcoming at Political Science Research and Methods.
China after Mao is typically characterized as a country where economic opportunities are based on merit instead of ideological conformity. However, the salience of ideology has grown under the rule of Xi Jinping. Using a large-scale resume audit experiment and a conjoint survey experiment of hiring managers in China, we find that firms in China do not reward job candidates for expressing conformity to the ideology of the regime, but job candidates who express support for Western democracy are less employable. Results suggest that firms in innovative industries designated as strategically important by the Chinese regime (e.g. artificial intelligence) penalize support for Western democracy by the largest magnitude while the remaining firms in innovative industries do not penalize political non-conformity.
Working Papers
Oppose Autocracy Without Support for Democracy: A Study of Non-Democratic Critics in China. With Haemin Jee.
(Revise and Resubmit)
Previous research on public opinion in authoritarian regimes generally assume that opponents of the status quo autocracy also support democracy. This paper challenges this assumption by identifying a key bloc within regime opponents: "non-democratic critics" (NDCs) or those who are dissatisfied with the current autocratic regime but resist adopting democracy. We develop the concept of NDC, theorize why they exist, and test implications of this framework using interviews and an original survey across China. We find that nearly half of respondents who oppose the current Chinese regime are non-democratic critics who also do not support democracy. Compared to democracy supporters, NDCs have a distinct set of political and socio-economic demands from government and higher uncertainty about the performance of democratic systems along these demands. We also find that NDCs are economically better-off than democracy supporters, suggesting that unequal access to the benefits of economic development in China may motivate differing attitudes toward democracy among regime opponents.
Gender and Political Compliance under Authoritarian Rule. With Yingjie Fan and Jennifer Pan.
Existing research on gender and politics has focused on political participation in democratic contexts. This paper shifts the focus to authoritarian contexts and examines the role of gender in political compliance. We argue that when autocrats use ambiguity to obtain voluntary compliance---for example, by setting broad objectives without giving explicit limits on the behavior of subjects---women and men, faced with different socialization experiences and expectation, will use divergent strategies to express political conformity. Based on interviews, a global survey, and an experiment conducted among Confucius Institute teachers, we find that the Chinese regime regulates the behavior of these teachers by prescribing objectives rather than specific behaviors. Confucius Institutes are China’s language and culture promotion programs that have been accused of exporting Chinese government propaganda and censorship. Given ambiguity over what behavior is permissible, we find that women express compliance by increasing uncensored discussions to persuade host country students to the Chinese regime’s point of view. In contrast, men comply by increasing censorship to assert the party line. Evidence suggests these gendered expressions of political compliance are related to the difference in social expectations. Strikingly, this substantial difference in behavior based on gender is not detected for other individual-level characteristics such as age, education, or political affiliation.
Selective Responsiveness for Authoritarian Control.
Lacking electoral incentives, why do authoritarian rulers invest in deliberative institutions that respond to citizen grievances? Previous research on authoritarian responsiveness largely contends that autocrats prioritize the appeals of potential dissidents. Instead, this paper argues that autocrats strategically provide responses of different quality to different segments of population for social control. Using original data of over 156,000 citizen appeals and government responses on Weibo (Chinese equivalent of Twitter), I show that local officials in China selectively provide substantive responses—responses that resolve the appealed problems—to citizens who demonstrate higher conformity to the regime's surveillance and censorship on the Internet. In contrast, officials selectively provide symbolic responses—responses that are rhetorical without solving the problems—to citizen appeals that are more likely to elicit collective action. Using interviews with local officials in East, Central, and West China, I find that officials perform this selective responsiveness primarily to set an example to petitioners and potential petitioners that compliance, not organized opposition, will open doors for satisfying their demands.
How Public Opinion Shapes Policy Outcomes in China: The Policy Feeler Mechanism.
Does public opinion influence policy outcomes in authoritarian countries? I argue that autocrats strategically release feelers of policy initiatives to the public, monitor discussion about the feelers on social media, and choose to confirm, deny, or adjust the policies based on public discussion. This paper examines the existence and use of policy feelers in China. Using 285,267 posts for a random sample of policy feelers released in governmental press conferences in 2012, this paper finds that the probability of policy enactment decreases in the proportion of negative posts against the policy. Also, provincial governments in economically more developed regions release more policy feelers on average.
(Revise and Resubmit)
Previous research on public opinion in authoritarian regimes generally assume that opponents of the status quo autocracy also support democracy. This paper challenges this assumption by identifying a key bloc within regime opponents: "non-democratic critics" (NDCs) or those who are dissatisfied with the current autocratic regime but resist adopting democracy. We develop the concept of NDC, theorize why they exist, and test implications of this framework using interviews and an original survey across China. We find that nearly half of respondents who oppose the current Chinese regime are non-democratic critics who also do not support democracy. Compared to democracy supporters, NDCs have a distinct set of political and socio-economic demands from government and higher uncertainty about the performance of democratic systems along these demands. We also find that NDCs are economically better-off than democracy supporters, suggesting that unequal access to the benefits of economic development in China may motivate differing attitudes toward democracy among regime opponents.
Gender and Political Compliance under Authoritarian Rule. With Yingjie Fan and Jennifer Pan.
Existing research on gender and politics has focused on political participation in democratic contexts. This paper shifts the focus to authoritarian contexts and examines the role of gender in political compliance. We argue that when autocrats use ambiguity to obtain voluntary compliance---for example, by setting broad objectives without giving explicit limits on the behavior of subjects---women and men, faced with different socialization experiences and expectation, will use divergent strategies to express political conformity. Based on interviews, a global survey, and an experiment conducted among Confucius Institute teachers, we find that the Chinese regime regulates the behavior of these teachers by prescribing objectives rather than specific behaviors. Confucius Institutes are China’s language and culture promotion programs that have been accused of exporting Chinese government propaganda and censorship. Given ambiguity over what behavior is permissible, we find that women express compliance by increasing uncensored discussions to persuade host country students to the Chinese regime’s point of view. In contrast, men comply by increasing censorship to assert the party line. Evidence suggests these gendered expressions of political compliance are related to the difference in social expectations. Strikingly, this substantial difference in behavior based on gender is not detected for other individual-level characteristics such as age, education, or political affiliation.
Selective Responsiveness for Authoritarian Control.
Lacking electoral incentives, why do authoritarian rulers invest in deliberative institutions that respond to citizen grievances? Previous research on authoritarian responsiveness largely contends that autocrats prioritize the appeals of potential dissidents. Instead, this paper argues that autocrats strategically provide responses of different quality to different segments of population for social control. Using original data of over 156,000 citizen appeals and government responses on Weibo (Chinese equivalent of Twitter), I show that local officials in China selectively provide substantive responses—responses that resolve the appealed problems—to citizens who demonstrate higher conformity to the regime's surveillance and censorship on the Internet. In contrast, officials selectively provide symbolic responses—responses that are rhetorical without solving the problems—to citizen appeals that are more likely to elicit collective action. Using interviews with local officials in East, Central, and West China, I find that officials perform this selective responsiveness primarily to set an example to petitioners and potential petitioners that compliance, not organized opposition, will open doors for satisfying their demands.
How Public Opinion Shapes Policy Outcomes in China: The Policy Feeler Mechanism.
Does public opinion influence policy outcomes in authoritarian countries? I argue that autocrats strategically release feelers of policy initiatives to the public, monitor discussion about the feelers on social media, and choose to confirm, deny, or adjust the policies based on public discussion. This paper examines the existence and use of policy feelers in China. Using 285,267 posts for a random sample of policy feelers released in governmental press conferences in 2012, this paper finds that the probability of policy enactment decreases in the proportion of negative posts against the policy. Also, provincial governments in economically more developed regions release more policy feelers on average.
Selected Work in Progress
- "How the Socialist Rhetoric in Appeals Increase Government Responsiveness in China."
- "Rightful Sabotage: How Local Officials Encourage People to Violate the One Child Policy."
- "How Deliberative Institutions Substitute for Co-optation and Repression: A Cross-Country Analysis."
- "Citizen Petition and Accountability under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping."